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fiscal reform and federal relations:  
Brazilian deadlocks
Basilia maria BaPTisTa aGuirre 
Guilherme leiTe da silva dias*
Brazilian fiscal reform got to deadlocks because proposals tried to avoid consid-
ering federal relations. There are two main types of federal relations: the competitive 
and the cooperative. In both types is possible to observe coordination mechanisms. 
Brazilian federalism is a mixture of both types what leads to difficulties finding solu-
tions. We argue that is more important to find mechanisms to facilitate cooperation 
than to discuss the qualities of any alternative fiscal structure. Fiscal reforms brings 
along a great deal of uncertainty. So it is important to discuss the reform timing and 
the compensation mechanisms before hand.
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Brazilian tax burden is amazingly high even when compared to developed 
countries contrary to the results often found for developing countries. In the be-
ginning of the 90’s Brazilian tax burden was 25% of GdP and by 2004 it was 
more than 32.8% of GdP1. This could indicate that Brazilian fiscal structure has 
no problems. However, the means by which this high burden was achieved is 
considered to be really damaging to Brazilian productive structure and also not 
favourable for cooperation among levels of government. There is consensus be-
tween annalists that a significant fiscal reform is long needed. However after the 
stabilization in 1994 all the attempts to implement a broad reform have failed. 
Fiscal reform debate has avoided discussing the problems of federal relations be-
1 This figure is the current result after the revision made by IBGE in 2005.
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cause of an understanding that this could increase resistances to changes.  How-
ever in a federation it is almost impossible to discuss fiscal reform without deal-
ing with the conflicting issues of federal relations. In our view fiscal reform debate 
in Brazil has taken a route that does not conduct to a solution. Since the 1988 
Constitution Brazilian fiscal structure have been changing in a way as to bring 
many problems to Brazilian economic structure. In this article we argue that a 
better way to approach fiscal problems would be to understand the elements that 
lead to deadlocks and hinders cooperation among actors involved. Institutional 
economics mainly the approach of North (1990, 2005) and the extensions of-
fered by dixit (1996) and Acemolgu and alli (2004) provides an adequate frame-
work to tackle this issue.
The article is divided as follows. The first section points the Brazilian fiscal 
problems and the failure of the proposals that where advanced to solve then. Next 
it is discussed how intergovernmental problems are better understood as a prob-
lem of allocation of property rights among government levels in the presence of 
distributional conflict. In the third section we identify the main conflicts that can 
be observed in inter-governmental relations and finally, on the fourth section, we 
point out which are the main determinants of the observed paralysis and alterna-
tive routes of solution.
BRAZILIAN FISCAL STRUCTURE PROBLEMS ANd PROPOSALS 
There is a substantial literature pointing the flaws of Brazilian federal fiscal 
structure2. This list includes: the inadequacy of the structure after structural chang-
es like stabilization and commercial liberalization, excessive tax burden over firms, 
fiscal evasion, excessive payroll tax burden, fiscal war, regressive taxation, vertical 
imbalances, cascading taxation, unclearly defined competencies between levels of 
government in many areas of public policy, among the most important. Authors 
are also unanimous about the consequences: damaging effects over the productive 
sector specially the export sector, absence of coordination between levels of gov-
ernment on collection and expenditure, maintenance or even worsening income 
distribution concentration. 
The origins of these problems could be traced back to the extensive fiscal 
reform undertaken by the Military Government in 1967 and the 1988 Constitu-
tion. Moreover a large number of small changes have significantly altered fiscal 
structure.
The main picture can be seen in Graphic 1, depicting the evolution of Bra-
2 A non exhaustible list of this literature includes: Afonso, J.R.R. and Mello, L. de (2000),  Afonso, J. 
R., E. A. Araújo, F. Rezende e R. Varsano (2000), Aguirre, B.M.B. (1999), Varsano, R. (1995), Varsa-
no, R. (1999), Varsano, R. (2002), Werneck, R.L.F. (2002) and Werneck, R. L. F. (2000).
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zilian tax burden and expenditures composition in three levels of government. 
First of all it is interesting to call attention to the fact that almost all along the 
period we observe fiscal unbalances. Federal government with rare exceptions 
showed fiscal surplus compared to primary expenditure while state and munici-
pality levels showed deficit. These differences can be explained by two reasons: 
transferences and indebtedness. States and municipalities until 1998 where al-
lowed to borrow including from their state owned banks. Transferences by the 
other side are a usual mechanism used by federal government since the advent 
of the republic in 1889 to cope with problems of regional imbalances. In 1967 
they became constitutionally compulsory and federal government began to au-
tomatically transfer a significant amount of its revenues to states and munici-
palities. 
Graphic 1 
Participation of Government Levels in Total Tax Burden and Public Expenditure 
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However what strikes most in this graphic is the close relation between main 
political Brazilian events and the changes in fiscal structures. Before 1929 when 
states where totally autonomous to tax and borrow we see an increasing trend of 
state revenues and expenditures while federal government faced decreases. Be-
tween 930 and 1945, a period in turmoil because of internal and external events, 
it is possible to see a reversal in the observed tendency due mainly to measures 
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adopted by the Vargas dictatorship in order to increase central government power 
in relation to states. during the re-democratization period between 1945 and 
1964, we observe a relative stability. After the fiscal reform implemented by the 
Military Regime in 1966 state governments suffered a huge decline in their share 
of taxes while municipalities increased their share in expenditures due to larger 
transferences from federal tax collection.  The re-democratization process, starting 
in 1982 with the first election for state government in 18 years, changed again the 
pattern. Now federal government began to loose participation while state and 
municipalities gain. After the 1988 Constitution, the trend is again altered with 
federal government trying to recuperate losses between 1982 and 1988. In short 
what this graphic shows is a century long distributional conflict between levels of 
government.
Brazilian public indebtedness has been in the centre of the fiscal problem 
since 1970. All three levels of government were allowed to borrow without restric-
tions even from their own financial institutions until 1998. 
Traditional literature on Brazilian fiscal structure problems concentrates on 
proposals to solve them without giving much attention to the fact that economic 
policy is a matter of political outcomes. The usual diagnosis is about significant 
allocative inefficiencies with a technical design to solve it, if this does not happen 
it is because of a lack in political will. In our view, it is a much more complex 
problem of distributional conflict between levels of government, the inexistence of 
cooperation mechanisms in inter-government relations have been dampening the 
possibilities of reform, a better understanding of the conflict is necessary in order 
to tackle them with better expectations of success.
A good evidence of the point made above is the sequence of fiscal reform 
proposals made in the last 10 years. during this period Brazilian society witnessed 
at least five reform attempts by the federal government, none of them were ad-
opted. They began in 1997, during the Cardoso government, Werneck (2002 and 
2003) analyses these proposals: “They seem to share the same basic diagnosis on 
what is wrong with indirect taxation in the country. They are strikingly similar 
in what concerns taxes to be eliminated. And are not so dissimilar in what con-
cerns taxes to be created” (Werneck, 2003: 9). The proposals mainly suggested a 
reform on the VAT tax which is today the main revenue source of state govern-
ments and the higher single tax collection and the elimination of a bundle of taxes 
considered damaging to the countries economy. Table 1 presents the main features 
of the proposals. 
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Table 1 
Fiscal Reform Proposals
Proposal Taxes to be eliminated Taxes to be created
Executive’s Late  
1997 Proposal  
October 1997
All turnover and cascading taxes (Cofins, PIS-
Pasep), except tax on financial transactions
Nationally-managed VAT
Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI)
Federal excise tax on goods 
and services
State VAT (ICMS) Retail sales tax (IVV)
Service tax charged by local governments (ISS)  
Executive’s Late  
1999 Proposal  
October 1999
All turnover and cascading taxes (Cofins,  
PIS-Pasep), except tax on financial transactions
Federal VAT
Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI)
State excise tax on goods 
and services
State VAT (ICMS)
Municipal retail sales tax 
(IVV)
Service tax charged by local governments (ISS)  
Executive’s  
Proposal  
August 2000
Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI)
Federal tax on goods and 
services (IBS)
State VAT (ICMS)
Nationally uniformed state 
VAT
Service tax charged by local governments (ISS)
Municipal retail sales tax 
(IVV)
Special  
Committee’s  
Proposal  
March 2000
All turnover and cascading taxes  
(Cofins, PIS-Pasep, CPMF)
Dual VAT (coexisting  
federal and state VATs)
Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI)
Municipal retail sales tax 
(IVV)
State VAT (ICMS)  
Service tax charged by local governments (ISS)  
Non-voted  
Rapporteurs’s  
Proposal  
March 2000
All turnover and cascading taxes  
(Cofins, PIS-Pasep, CPMF)
Dual VAT (coexisting  
federal and state VATs)
Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI) Non-cumulative excise tax
State VAT (ICMS)  
Service tax charged by local governments (ISS)  
Source: Werneck, R.L.F. (2003) An evaluation of the 2003 tax reform effort in Brazil Working paper No. 488, Rio de 
Janeiro: Pontifícia Universidade Católica.
However, we do not agree with Werneck that stated that: “… Considering 
that two of those proposals stemmed from the Executive and two from Congress 
that seems to point out to a surprising degree of agreement on the main line of the 
required reform” (Werneck, 2003: 9)3 In our view there are significant differences 
between the proposals that emerge from the federal executive and those that came 
3 The author does not make reference to the fifth proposal because he considers that that one was only 
to end the society’s outcry for fiscal reform at the end of the Fernando Henrique government.
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from the Congress. If we rearrange the information on Table 1 highlighting the 
sponsors the picture changes considerably. Table 2 presents the same information 
however it focuses on the origin of the suggestions. Beginning with the taxes to be 
eliminate what we see is that executive and legislative powers agreed that three 
taxes should be eliminated: Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI), Service 
tax charged by local governments (ISS) and State VAT. But this is the only agree-
ment that can be seen in this table. They disagreed on the elimination of tax on 
financial transactions (CPMF) which is one of the cascading federal taxes. Legisla-
tive power proposes to eliminate it while the executive never accepted its elimina-
tion. Federal Government was not ready to renounce to one of its major source of 
revenues even if it is damaging to the productive structure of the country. When 
we turn our attention to taxes to be created it is not possible to find a single agree-
ment between executive and legislative. The two legislative proposals maintained 
the idea of a dual VAT that should be collected by both federal and state levels. 
The executive proposals transforms state VAT into federal VAT. Only in the last 
one, that was not supposed to be a serious offer because it came too late in the 
legislature, federal government proposed a state VAT which should be nationally 
uniform. The idea of a nationally uniform VAT is something that in a way violates 
the very concept of federalism which should allow states some degree of power to 
collect and to legislate on taxes.
Table 2 
Another Picture of the Proposals
Taxes to be eliminated Executive Legislative
All turnover and cascading taxes (Cofins, PIS-Pasep), except tax on financial transactions 2  
All turnover and cascading taxes (Cofins, PIS-Pasep, CPMF)  2
Federal tax on manufactured products (IPI) 3 2
State VAT (ICMS) 3 2
Service tax charged by local governments (ISS) 3 2
Taxes to be created   
Dual VAT (coexisting federal and state VATs)  2
Federal excise tax on goods and services 1  
Federal VAT 1  
Nationally-managed VAT 1  
Federal tax on goods and services (IBS) 1  
Nationally uniformed state VAT 1  
Municipal retail sales tax (IVV) 2 1
Non-cumulative excise tax  1
Retail sales tax (IVV) 1  
State excise tax on goods and services 1  
Source: Elaboration of the authors.
Revista de Economia Política  29 (1), 2009 49
FISCAL FEdERAL STRUCTURE AS ALLOCATION  
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEVELS
The discussion above highlights the fact that fiscal reform in Brazil is a matter 
of intergovernmental relations. In this section we will argue that federations are 
institutional structures that need coordination mechanisms because of the impor-
tant distributional conflict between federal members.  
The inclusion of conflict into the analysis unveils a completely different world, 
improving the understanding of fiscal federal relations. In order to do so it is nec-
essary to recall a short description of the fiscal federalism approach usually uti-
lized in traditional economics. The literature on fiscal federalism is mainly worried 
about the efficiency of federal arrangements. Adopting a normative attitude it 
seeks to define what should be the optimal level of fiscal decentralization. 
The main problem faced by fiscal federalism literature is the existence of ex-
ternalities. Oates (1972) was aware of the problem when stated that: “... the opti-
mal degree of fiscal decentralization will vary substantially among different so-
cieties” (Oates, 1972: 31). The solution proposed by Oates (1972) was the 
inclusion of transferences from central government in the analysis because that 
could handle the externalities problem through matching revenues and jurisdic-
tions. This suggestion is based in the traditional Pigouvian solution to the exter-
nality problem. Transferences from central to lower level governments would real-
locate income from jurisdictions that impose negative externalities to those that 
suffer it. However this process is not costless. As Coase (1960) has demonstrated 
if the use of the price system has costs then the Pigouvian solution may not be the 
best. Transferences will demand negotiations between the involved jurisdictions 
that may compensate the welfare gain from decentralization. Even thought there 
are a number of other authors that tried to deal with the problem of externality 
related to federalism, none of then were able to present a reasonable solution 
within the limits of conventional economics4. Oates approach to the problem con-
tinues to be the main contribution to the question.
It is always appropriate to remember that according to Coase (1937) the cost-
ly nature of the price system is mainly due to uncertainty. If the actors knew which 
would be the best agreement they would not need to negotiate to get to the best 
alternative. It will be automatic as in the case of the so called Coase Theorem. It is 
also important to remind that when talking about federalism we are dealing with 
a problem that involves politics.
This brings us to dixit (dixit, 1996: 20) contribution to the problem of trans-
action costs in political transaction. Laws and constitutions last long, economic 
circumstances change a lot during constitution life, conflicts about contingencies 
are much more frequent in the political arena, and there are a larger number of 
4 A non exhaustible list should include: Besley and Coate (1999), Inman and Rubinfeld (1997),  Inman 
and Fitts (1990). 
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interests involved. Besides constitutions should be build in sufficient general term 
as to be applicable to many circumstances. On the other side there is a wide array 
of interpretation of the meaning of orderings and so constitutions allow much 
more manipulation than other kinds of contracts. These characteristics impose 
two important consequences. On one hand there is the problem of “time consis-
tency in policy”5, in the other multi-agency problems. According to dixit (1996) 
problems of temporal consistency arise because contracts in politics are very loose. 
Property rights are very blurred. Principals have no means as to make politicians 
or bureaucrats accountable. Moreover there are many difficulties to establish a 
clear relationship between agents and principals. Principals are usually the voters. 
This group however does not have a single interest, even some groups that could 
be recognized as having one common interest it is always possible to identify other 
kind of interest that may be of a conflicting nature. Agents are a heterogeneous 
group as well. Conflicts are also vivid among them. They are important not only 
between politicians and bureaucrats but also within politicians and bureaucrats 
groups. When the federalism problem is incorporated into the analysis the com-
plexity increases enormously. 
Applying this line of argument to federalism it is possible to say that a federal 
structure is a contract between society and government, what brings together all 
the problems pointed above but moreover it is a contract within the state among 
autonomous unities of policy making. In countries organized in unitary basis this 
characteristic does not arise. This means that policy decision depends not only of 
central government decision but also of lower level government decision, what 
make it necessary for government levels to coordinate their action in order to di-
minish inefficiencies. However, considering the problem of incompleteness of con-
tracts in the political arena, this is an issue that should not be handled as a maxi-
mization problem as the conventional theory would do. Probably a more adequate 
approach to deal with the issue in this case is to use North’s idea of uncertainty 
reduction. Following this line of argument we should look at the problem of es-
tablishing rights and competencies for various government levels, in a federal 
structure, as a means to reduce conflicts and to improve coordination. Institu-
tional design in this case is not an issue of finding an optimal design. Instead it is 
a question of finding what set of rules could attain the objectives pointed above in 
a specific political and economic environment. 
The conflict presented here is about distribution. Two kinds of distributional 
conflicts can be observed in this case. The first one is about distribution of tax col-
lection and competencies between levels of government and the second one is 
about income distribution between private and public sectors. Acemolgu et alli 
5 dixit (1996) also call this problem credibility problem. It is important to remark that this concept is 
different from the Macroeconomics concept of time consistency, which is defined as: “Time inconsis-
tency is said to arise if the optimal policy chosen at t1 for date t1 differs from the optimal policy for t1, 
which was chosen at t0 < t1, even though technology, preferences and information are the same at the 
two dates”. drazen (2000: 11) (The authors are grateful to an anonymous reader for this remark.)
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(2004) discussing the importance of institutions for economic development pres-
ents a framework of analysis that incorporates distributional conflict and high-
lights the importance of political institutions. The argument’s emphasis is on po-
litical power. Political power has two components: de jure political power and de 
facto political power. de facto political power is determined by distribution of 
resources while de jure political power depends on political institutions. The com-
bination the two political powers determine both economic institutions in the pe-
riod and political institutions in the next period. In doing so the authors make all 
the variables endogenous to the model and they highlight the importance of po-
litical institutions and political power to the determination of economic policy and 
economic performance.
Very important to the argument is the idea that the choice of economic insti-
tutions is a problem of collective decision. different groups have different prefer-
ences for institutions, because different sets of institutions will be responsible for 
different resource distribution. In a situation like this there is no optimal solution 
possible. This is why the authors sustain that political power is crucial to the out-
come. The question that arises at this point is: which will be the set of equilibrium 
institutions? And the answer to this question is: the set of institutions that is pre-
ferred by the group with the largest political power. This solution is not necessar-
ily optimal in the sense that no one loose, it is however, an equilibrium solution 
for no group will think useful to devote additional resource to change the situa-
tion unless some of the initial conditions change. What changes in initial condi-
tions could alter the result? To answer this question we have to understand better 
what constitutes political power.
Political power according to the definition of the authors has two elements. 
The first one is de facto power has two components: economic resources and ca-
pacity to solve problems of collective action. Economic resources are usually taken 
into consideration economic theory when dealing with questions like this. Capac-
ity to deal with problems of collective action is not. This has to do with what Ol-
son (1971) called our attention in the Logic of Collective Action, meaning group’s 
action efficiency in the presence of differences in common and individual interests. 
In addition there is a second important element in the analysis of the authors. This 
is the de jure political power. This element is not usual in economic theory. It 
deals with political rules and allocation of political rights. They establish the reach 
of the agents’ action in the political arena and in doing so they are also responsible 
for determining the possible outcomes. 
Using dixit (1996) and Acemoglu (2004) insights it is possible to advance a 
framework of analysis for federal relations and distribution of rights among levels 
of government. For the sake of simplicity it is possible to start by considering that 
there are only two government levels that are independent units of decision mak-
ing. However their actions are inter-dependent which means that there are exter-
nalities problems. Federal relation is not a natural cooperative relation. There is a 
huge potential for conflict in these situation. Federal members compete mainly for 
tax basis, but they also compete for the provision of public goods. So we have a 
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situation of distributional conflict in an area where contracts are very loose as 
dixit (1996) has called our attention. Each unity would prefer to have the largest 
share of tax receipts and, at the same time to provide the minimum amount of 
public goods that would not risk loosing votes. The rational behaviour would be 
to try to make the other government sphere to provide the goods without loosing 
taxes or votes. When this is the behaviour of all members the outcome would be a 
minimum provision of public goods. To solve this problem some kind of coordi-
nation mechanism should be introduced.
In this case it is possible to define two main ideal kinds of relationship be-
tween levels of government. We should call then: cooperative6 and competitive. 
The difference between these two forms of federalism can be found in the nature 
of the coordination mechanisms observed in each of the cases. In cooperative fed-
eralism policy to be executed in the territory of a member of the federation should 
somehow be agreed between central and lower governmental levels. On the other 
hand competitive federalism is the situation in which levels of government com-
pete for tax bases and supply of services for each federal member. 
The important point to be made about this classification of federalism types 
is that they have very different consequences to the transaction costs of inter-gov-
ernmental relationship. In the one hand cooperative federalism should give rise to 
high ex-ante transaction costs during the period prior to the agreement that deter-
mine decision rights among federal members and should show low ex-post trans-
action costs along the period of policy implementation and execution once it is 
supposed that in this phase members are not to compete. This of course will de-
pend on the specific rules that conforms federal relations. If competencies are 
clearly established in the Constitution it should be expected that ex-post transac-
tion costs should be at their minimum standards7. On the other hand competitive 
federalism should exhibit minimum ex-ante transaction costs, for there is no nego-
tiation between federal government levels, however there should be high ex-post 
transaction costs due to the lack of coordination on the provision of public goods 
between federal members. This should produce inefficiencies in the provision of 
public goods due mainly to externalities.
In consequence there is no a priori possible conclusion about the superiority 
of cooperative federalism over competitive federalism or vice-versa. The trade-off 
between ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs may make both forms of federalism 
similar in terms of total transaction costs. However competitive and cooperative 
6 Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) also have a definition of cooperative federalism which involves the una-
nimity rule. These authors defined cooperative federalism as the principle that “prefer the most decen-
tralized structure capable of internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the constitutional cons-
traint that all central government policies are agreed to unanimously by the elected representatives 
from each of the lower-tier governments.” (Inman e Rubinfeld, 1997: 48) This cooperative federalism 
definition is based on the American federalism structure and is not useful for our purposes. 
7 There could however be, in this case, high ex-post transaction cost for institutional change due to the 
rigidities imposed by the difficulties of changing Constitutions.
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federalisms are pure Weberian ideal types. They are just abstract representations 
of federal arrangements that help us think about current federal structures in terms 
of solving conflicts in the process of intergovernmental relations. We can also 
think of then as extremes of a continuum which allows many other federal organi-
zation forms. Each one of the extremes would be a situation where ex-ante or ex-
post transaction costs would be in such a low level as to produce the lowest total 
transaction costs possible. This would be because the cooperation mechanisms at 
work would be the best possible. Intermediate positions along the continuum 
should represent total transaction costs higher then the extremes. This means that 
various combinations of elements of competitive federalism with cooperative fed-
eralism would be less efficient alternatives in various degrees. 
Why should the intermediate positions be less efficient? Federal organizations 
are contracts network. As was said above they provide members with the basic 
rules of their relationship. When these rules offer conflicting signals the function-
ing of the system may be damaged. Cooperative federalism is an arrangement that 
is close to the idea of an organization, like a firm, in Coase’s definition where 
things are settled through agreements. Competitive federalism is close to the idea 
of a market where solutions are reached through agent’s individual effort to im-
prove his or hers performance, independently from the others. If the arrangement 
allows agents to seek their individual interests within an agreement the result 
would be at the expense of cooperation. 
There are a few basic characteristics that differentiate cooperative and com-
petitive federalism and they can be observed in fiscal structure. Concretely speak-
ing in economic terms cooperative federalism operates in a system of tax-sharing. 
Taxes could be collect by central and/or state governments but they are usually 
distributed according to the responsibilities that each member has. And no it does 
not matter much which level is collecting. The principle that orientates who gets 
what is the principle of equal capacity to provide public or collective goods in the 
territory of each member state and this principle is usually stated in the Constitu-
tion or in law. In competitive federalism members of the federation make indi-
vidual efforts to collect taxes and there is no agreement on sharing the results of 
these individual collection efforts. 
In cooperative federalism tax base is also a matter of negotiation. Each fed-
eral level is attributed a specific base which cannot be taxed by other levels. In 
competitive federalism, federal and state levels compete for a common tax base 
like income for example. definition of competencies in cooperative federalism are 
stated in Constitution or in the law while in competitive federalism it is up to each 
member to decide what to do. Finally with respect to transferences in cooperative 
federalism there are compulsory transferences that could be expended freely by 
lower government level and they usually follow the principle of compensatory 
transferences to attain a similar capacity of expending in all states. Transferences 
in competitive federalism are voluntary, earn-market and they are mainly to indi-
viduals and organizations rather than to other government levels. Table 1 sum-
marizes the main features of each federalism ideal type.
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Table 3 
Main Characteristics of Ideal Federalism Types
cooperative competitive
tax-sharing exclusive taxation
definition of tax base per level of government competition for tax base
definition of competencies common competencies
compulsory transferencies voluntary transferences
free transferencies earn market tranferencies
compensatory transferencies to governments transferences to individuals
Source: Elaboration of the authors.
Each one of these ideal federalism types has its own cooperation mechanism 
and the features described above are the rules that characterized then. In real 
world there is no such a thing as a perfect cooperative or competitive federalism. 
What is possible to be observed is a variety of combination of both competitive 
and cooperative federalism. Each of one of these combinations will show some 
degree of transaction cost that should be higher than the ideal types. Some coun-
tries exhibit a higher degree of competitive federalism, like USA, while others are 
mainly characterized by cooperative federalism, like Canada or Germany. The 
question so is what are the minimum transaction costs possible for a given coun-
try? The minimum transaction cost possible for a given situation would emerge 
from the combination of features that reduces conflicts between jurisdictions mak-
ing it possible to internalize the higher amount of externalities possible and pro-
vide the higher level of public goods. To answer to this question it is necessary to 
turn our attention to the case here in analysis. We argue that in the Brazilian case 
there are certain features of both competitive and cooperative federalism that are 
combined and that are responsible for increasing transaction costs due to the 
weakening of the cooperation mechanisms. It will be shown that this result is a 
consequence of a path dependence process in fiscal structure that have been evolv-
ing since the Military Brazilian Government and whose deadlocks are still waiting 
to be solved.
BRAZILIAN FISCAL STRUCTURE EVOLUTION ANd PATH dEPENdENCE
Since the event of the 1988 Constitution a series of fiscal changes were made 
even though it was not possible to undertake a major fiscal reform. 1988 Consti-
tution transferred a significant amount of resources from federal to state and mu-
nicipal levels without transferring competencies. The new situation was one of 
state and municipal enrichment in relation to federal level impoverishment. This 
situation was aggravated with the inexistence of controls over state and municipal 
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indebtedness.  In Graphic 2 we observe the trends of fiscal revenues and dispos-
able revenues by government level. 
Graphic 2 
Revenue and Disposable Revenue % PIB by Government  
Level 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1988-2004
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Source: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Contas Nacionais.
From 1980 to 1991 federal government revenues share shows a variable pat-
tern while state and local levels increase their shares. This was the result of chang-
es in government level’s property rights. Federal government transfers to both 
state and local government increase as well as transfers from state to local govern-
ment. Local government was the level that received the largest gain. (See Graphic 
3) This period was characterized by hipper-inflation. Even thought local level net 
gain was really amazing. 
This new fiscal structure was a result of a well succeeded mobilization for 
decentralization made mainly by local government level politicians that managed 
to influence legislators. It imposed a heavy burden on the Union for the majority 
of responsibilities were still poorly defined and federal government maintained all 
its responsibilities. Graphic 3 gives a good picture of the inter-governmental distri-
butional conflict. The principal trend shows a continuous federal loss, fairly stable 
tendency for state governments and a local level continuous gain. However there 
are some moments in this period when we see some reaction from federal govern-
ment and others when state or local government succeed to regain terrain. This is 
the process by with Brazilian fiscal federalism evolves with periods of centraliza-
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tion and others of decentralization. The important point to investigate is the 
mechanisms utilized by the three government levels in this conflict. In other words 
how intergovernmental rights evolve.  
Graphic 3 
Revenues Gains or Losses by Government Level - 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1988-2004
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Source: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Contas Nacionais.
Observing Graphic 3 it is possible to identify 5 periods after 1980 when chang-
es have happen. Each one of these changes represents an attack from one or more of 
federation units over the revenues’ share of the others. From 1980 to 1988 both 
federal and state governments loose shares to local level. Between 1988 and 1990 
federal government manage to recuperate part of its loss mainly at the expenses of 
the states, while local governments suffered a slight loss. The period that goes from 
1990 to 1994 exhibits a certain stability that was interrupted in 1995 when federal 
government suffered a huge loss. Only after 1997 federal government recuperates in 
part its share on revenues. This process configures a fierce battle between federal 
members that could not coordinate its action and that the only way envisaged de-
fending itself is to attack the others. We will show that this process is the result of 
the absence of capacity to negotiate among federation members. 
To effectively change a situation like this in Brazil as in many federations it is 
necessary to change the Constitution. There are two ways to do so: constitutional 
revision or constitutional amendment. Constitutional amendment requires the ap-
proval of 2/3 of the Congress. Constitutional revision requires only 50% approval 
but could not be done at anytime and is a widespread process that is not limited to 
the issue at stake. In 1993 the Constitution was revised and federal government 
suffered another unfavourable impact on tax shares. The urgency of macroeco-
nomic problems could have determined this apathy concerning fiscal problems 
from the part of federal government. An alternative explanation is that federal 
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government was, by that time, envisaging other formulas to solve its financial cri-
sis and decided not to allocate resources to enter into a difficult negotiation with 
congress that could even worse its situation. 
From 1988 to 1990 federal government succeeded to reverse the situation 
mainly through reducing non constitutional transferences and increasing tax rates 
of non-shared taxes. This was a reaction to the trend established after the begin-
ning of the 80’s with the re-democratization process. Unfortunately there are no 
disaggregating data about federal revenues for this period. Even though Graphic 2 
shows how federal government revenues grew much faster the other levels reve-
nues in this period. This result can only be attributable to growth in taxes. What 
is clear is that federal success was obtained by imposing non negotiated loss in 
revenues shares to the other two government spheres. 
From 1990 to 1994 there is certain stability. The possibility of changing Con-
stitution in 1993 could explain this outcome. But instead of improving federal fi-
nances Constitutional revision imposed another loss to federal government8. This 
loss was mainly due to the prohibition that any other tax except states VAT could 
be collect from public utilities services like electric energy, inter-state and munici-
pal transportation, communication, fuel and minerals9. This was another victory 
of lower government levels because this tax is collected by state government and 
shared with local governments. 
It took three years for a federal government reaction. Meanwhile two other 
important events were evolving. The first was the state debt renegotiation and the 
other was the beginning of the establishment of clear responsibilities among fed-
eral members. 
State and municipalities debt in 1991 was 11,5 % of PIB, in 1996 it reached 
5,8% of PIB. After stabilization process it became inevitable to control state debt 
as part of stabilization efforts. Federal government try to force states to do it by 
offering states a debt negotiation. According to Rezende e Affonso (2000) state 
bonds were exchanged by federal bonds, real interests were set on a maximum 
7,5% and there was also a provision that interests payments could not exceed 
11% of states tax collection. The result was that after 1997 states interests’ pay-
ments were reduced significantly while federal interests’ payments increased sharp-
ly and states debt grew at a much lower rate than federal debt. Once again federal 
government suffered further loss.
In 1996 a set new set of norms that intended to provide a clear definition of 
responsibilities of government levels concerning health services. The NOBSUS-96, 
as it was called, established that the provision of public health services should be 
done by local level governments and costs should be shared between the three 
levels. Later in 1998 another set of norms established responsibilities for educa-
tion policy with the same principles presented in public health services policy. 
8 Constitutional Revision Amendment No 3/1996 was introduced on Article 155 that defines states 
taxes. 
9 Also for this period there is no disaggregated tax collection data.
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Both initiatives represented additional burden to federal government for it became 
responsible for an important part of the financing.
Graphic 4 
Union, States and Municipalities Interests Payments,  % GDP
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
Graphic 5 
Union, States and Municipalities Debts, % GDP
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
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Federal government reaction began in 1999 when federal taxes grew 7,5%. 
during 1996 and 2000 federal taxes increased at an average rate of 4,5%. In the 
same period states and municipalities taxes increased 3,4% and 2% respectively. 
The increase in federal taxes was due mainly to the elevation of rates for taxes that 
are not shared with states and municipalities and the creation of new taxes. In do-
ing so the outcomes of these efforts were totally appropriate by federal govern-
ment without having to be involved in an exhaustive negotiation with states and 
municipalities in Congress. Furthermore experience had shown that in fiscal mat-
ters federal government had suffered successive defeats in Congress and that it was 
easier to raise taxes by means that does not need the acquaintance of states and 
municipalities.
Graphic 6 
Taxes shared and non shared Union and States, % GDP
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Source: Tesouro Nacional.
The process describe so far has two main undesirable consequences. The first 
is the burden imposed on productive sector of the economy as the increasing non-
shared taxes were all cascading taxes which impose heavy costs to Brazilian econ-
omy and as total tax burden increases without favoring the perception by the 
public of an improvement in public services provision. The second is a non coor-
dinated pattern of intergovernmental relation, characterized as tug of war; each 
time one actor reacts causing damage to a third party; general public cannot rec-
ognize the causal relation between improvement in public service provision and a 
generalized increase in tax burden, the reaction chain goes on indefinitely. About 
the first much has been written by Brazilian economists. About the second there is 
a widespread unawareness. We argue that the second consequence is the principal 
determinant of the costs determined by a larger tax burden. 
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dETERMINANTS OF dEAdLOCKS
Intergovernmental relations in Brazil evolved in a way as not to favour coop-
eration. As states and municipalities accumulate victories over federal government 
in Congress they developed the belief that it was not necessary to negotiate and 
that they could always solve they financial problems by imposing further losses to 
federal government. From its part federal government reacted since 1991 by in-
creasing and creating taxes. Both sides of the fight use their instruments as power 
mechanisms to reach their goals. The problem is that this is a zero or negative sum 
game to the public sector and the economy. Either one or more government sphere 
looses or either private sector pays the bill through tax burden increases. It is clear 
that this process involves two distributional conflicts. The first conflict is between 
spheres of government and the other between public and private sector.
In this case deadlocks will be found on the structure of intergovernmental 
relations. First, there is no mandatory provision that revenues’ changes should be 
accompanied by responsibility changes. Lower level governments as well as fed-
eral government, each with the mechanisms at their disposal; have been changing 
tax structure without having to account for the uses of the additional resources. 
Brazilian federalism presented the main characteristics of cooperative federalism, 
as defined earlier. It has tax-sharing, definition of tax base per level of govern-
ment, definitions of competencies, compulsory transferences and compensatory 
transferences. However it also has some competitive federalism features as: exclu-
sive taxation for certain taxes, competition for tax base between federal and state 
governments and also among state governments, voluntary transferences. This 
structure opens room to a predatory competition between levels of government 
that has the consequences pointed in the literature. 
The solution to the problem should emerge from negotiations in Congress on 
how to diminish potential conflict in intergovernmental relations. A promising 
route could be reached through property rights reallocation between federation 
members in order to prevent any one of them to impose losses on the other(s). For 
instances, a way of doing so would be to prohibit Union to increase tax rates with-
out Congress’ acquiescence.  At the same time it would be necessary to allow fed-
eral government to interfere on states decision on tax changes, as those that con-
duct to fiscal war. These changes would induce federal units to enter into 
negotiation whenever changes are desired by one of them. 
Any intense negotiation period between federal members is a process full of 
uncertainty. To cope with this problem three elements are essential: first it is not 
reasonable to expect that this process could be finished in a short span of time, it 
is wiser to define a schedule long enough to guarantee full awareness of the conse-
quences of each step; second there should always be the possibility of decision re-
vision; finally it will be important to establish a compensatory framework, what 
have been recurrently repudiated by federal government,  to avoid heavy losses on 
any part involved. In doing so we believe that it will be easier to ensure participa-
tion and reach concrete solutions.
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